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Negotiated Trade Restrictions with Private Political Pressure
ABSTRACT
In this paper we consider a home government withpolitical pressure to
restrict trade, at the expense of foreigners. Theforeign country is
compensated with an income transfer, which can be thought ofas a portion of
thetariff revenues or quota rents. In thissetting the two countries should
negotiate over the level of tariff and transfer ofrents, depending on the
level of politicalpressure at home. However, ifthis pressure cannot be
directlyobserved abroad, then the home countrymay have anincentive to claim
arbitarily high political need and seek corresponding high tradebarriers. We
resolve this problem by determiningincentive compatible trade policies, in









Recent literature in international trade hasemphasized that trade
barriers often result from political objectives. These includethe desire of
politicians to satisfy a majority of voters (Mayer, 1984).or respond to
special interest lobbying groups.' The empirical basis for thesemodels is
well established (see Baldwin, 1986). It issurprising, however, that this
literature has focused on a small country setting trade barrierswithout
any foreign repercussions. Thus, while the interests of domesticgroups are
of critical importance, those of foreigners haveonly recently been considered.
For example, Das (1986), Husted (1986) and Hillman andUrsprung (1987) examine
how foreign lobbying affects domestic trade policy.
In this paper we shall consider a home government withpolitical pressure
to restrict trade, at the expense of foreigners. Theforeign country is
compensated with an income transfer, which can be thought of as aportion of
the tariff revenues or quota rents. In this setting the twocountries should
negotiate over the level of tariff and transfer of rents, depending on the
level of political pressure at home. However, if thispressure cannot be
directly observed abroad, then the home country may have an incentive to claim
arbitarily high political need and seek corresponding high trade barriers. We
shall resolve this problem by determining incentivecompatible trade policies,
in which the home government has no incentive to overstate (orunderstate) the
political pressure for protection.2
While our analysis is theoretical, it has direct policyimplications.
Studies in the U.S. have recently called for the auctioning of tradequotas
with the proceeds going to the U.S. Treasury, or used to buy off domestic
groups lobbying for protection.3 Our analysis suggests that the receipt of2.
these revenues could increase the lobbyingfor or level of protection, as
domestic groups or the government exaggeratethe political cost of Imports.
In order to maintain incentive compatibility(no overstatement of political
costs), it is necessary to leave a portionof the tariff revenues or quota
rents with foreigners.
In section 2 we outline a simple politicalmodel of protection. We adopt
Mayer's (1984) median voter model,in which the government seeks to restrict
imports and shift income towardslabor. In section 3 we introduce the foreign
country and discuss the incentivesof some conventional trade policies. If
the home country receives all the tariff revenue,it will generally have an
incentive to overstate the political pressure.
In section 4 we solve for the
incentive compatible trade policies. These cantake the form of "tariff—rate
quotas," or "tariff-quotas," in whichthe tariff is applied to imports
exceeding some limit. Varying thislimit permits the revenue/rents to be
allocated across countries, and thereforeaffects the incentives for
protection at home. In section 5 we brieflyconsider the case where political
pressure exists in both countries,and section 6 concludes. More technical
proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
2.Median Voter Model
We consider a two good, two factor economywith constant returns to
scale, where the import competing goodis labor intensive. Let p denote the
domestic price of this good, with the export goodas numeraire. Then factor
prices are w =w(p)and r =p(p),where w' >0and p' <0due to our factor
intensity assumption. Protecting the importgood will raise p and shift
income towards labor.3.
As in Mayer (1984), we shallSuppose that consumers are endowed with both
labor and capital. Individuals haveequal amounts of labor and we normalize
the total population to unity. Leta denote the capital/labor endowment of
individuals, which is distributed with mean ofand median a0. We assume
that a0 <z,which applies when the distribution ofcapital is skewed to the
right,4 In this model consumers differonly in their factor income. Under
majority voting, the government will respond to theinterests of the consumer
with capital endowmentc —themedian voter. In this section we shallderive
a reduced form expression for the utility of themedian voter, which will
serve as the government's objective function. Whilethe median voter model of
government policy choice is not universallydescriptive, it does provide us
with a simple and concrete basis forgenerating political costs associated
with imports (see Mayer (1984) andsome of the references cited therein for a
discussion of the limitations of the medianvote model). Of course there are
other explanations for the presence ofpolitical costs of importing, which the
reader is free to adopt in consideringour model.
Denoting consumption of the importable byci and of the exportable as c2,
let the utility of an individual be(c1) +c2,with '> 0,•"< 0.The
additively seperable form simplifies our analysis, andmeans that all
individuals choose the sameci, regardless of their type, assuming they have
sufficient income. Recalling that thepopulation is normalized at unity, in
the aggregate we will havec1 =yl(p)+zwhere yi(p) is domestic supply
supply (yj0) and z are imports. The equilibrium domesticprice can be
determined from the consumers' first—order condition:
=p >p=w(z), (1)4.
where ii'= "/(1—"y1)<0.
Consumption C2 will be total income minus pci.Income consists of factor
earnings w +ar(per unit of labor) plus redistributedtariff revenue.
Denoting exports by x, the terms oftrade are (x/z) so tariff revenue is
[p—(x/z)]z =pz—x,which is also the trade balance evaluated atdomestic
prices. We assume the revenueis distributed as a poll subsidy, equally











The third equality in (2) follows sincethe value of factor income (w+r)
equals output (py+y) in our competitive,constant returns economy. In the
last equality note that y-x equals the aggregate(and average) consumption of
good 2. Then C2 for anindividual will be greater (less) than the average
when that person's capital/labor endowment
is greater (less) than the mean.






u' =p>0,and r' =p'i > 0. (3b)5.
The last result occurs because an Increase inimports lowers the domestic
price p and thus raises the return to capital. Using (3),we can write
utility •(c1) +cas follows:
Proposition 1. The utility of an individual with capital/laborendowment is
U(z,x,a) =u(z)—x-(-cx)r(z). (4)
To interpret this result, note that the consumer withaverage capital
endowment ofreceives utility u(z) -x.The median voter will receive lower
utility by the amount (-)r(z), where this reduction is an increasing
function of imports z. Thus, imports impose acomponent of welfare loss on
the median voter, by lowering p and shifting income from laborto capital.
The government will have an incentive to shift income in theopposite
direction using trade restrictions or other instruments.6
Before examining trade policy, we note a special case ofProposition 1.
If the production functions in the economy are Leontief (fixedcoefficients on
labor and capital) and ,(ci) is quadratic, the u(z) will bequadratic and r(z)
linear in (4). We shall refer to this as the quadraticcase, and use it
occasionally. This case guarantees that <0in (4). However, we will
make the stronger assumption that <0in general, which will ensure that
certain second order conditions are satisfied.
3. Negotiated Trade and Incentive Compatible Policies
Let the foreign country's utility function be,
V(z,x) =x-v(z), (5)6.
where v represents the cost of supplying z, withv' > 0, v"0. A treatment
of political pressure abroad is deferred to section5. In a slight change of
notation, let a denote the capital/labor endowmentof the median voter at
home. The identity of this voter will depend on populationdynamics and other
socio-econOmiC patterns, which we summarize by giving a aprobability density
f(a) with strictly positive support over[a,a].7 This density is common
knowledge but only the home government observesthe realization of a.
We shall assume that the foreign and domestic country areinitially
governed by a trade agreement which specifiesthe level of imports z0 and
exports x0 to be exchanged. While wetreat <z°, x0> as arbitrarily specified,
in practice they would be determined by economicand political conditions as
well as the relative bargaining positions of the twocountries. Given this
original agreement, the home country may wishto change the level and terms of
trade occasionally to account for the political costsof importation at home.
For example if a turns out to be low, so theredistributive costs of imports
are high, the domestic government maywant to apply for a reduction in imports
to ease the political pressure it faces.
Towards this end, we assume that the two countries negotiate aschedule
of trades <z(ct), x(a)> which are applied contingent onthe value of a
announced by the home country. For this negotiated agreementto be feasible
we require that it be incentive compatible(IC), meaning that the menu of
trades <z(a), x(a)> must be designed so that thehome country truthfully
reports a.8 To formalize this idea letU(a'/a) denote the utility of the home
country when it announces a' and a isthe actual value. tJ(a'/a) is defined by7.
U(Z(a'))X(a') —(—a)r(z(cz')). (6)
Incentive compatibility requires
U(ctJa) > U(cz'/a) for alla, a'. (IC)
(IC) restricts the set of trade policies whichcan be implemented. For
example, consider a policy designed to maximize thesum of domestic and
foreign country welfare, inclusive of the political costs ofimporting as
perceived by the home country. Denote this sum by
W(Z,a)u(z(a)) —(ra)r(z(ci))—v(z(a)),
and letz*(U)=argmax W(z,a), where z satisfies
= U'(Z*(ct))—c;_a)r'(z*(a))—v'(z*(a))=0. (7)
Weshall refer to z as the "politically optimal" level oftrade. It provides
for efficient trade subject to political constraintsat home. Note that z' =
r'/(v"-(J)> 0, since lower values ofa raise the redistributive cost of
Imports, and reduce their optimal level. In principle Z*(a) couldbe
implemented with a specific tariff of
I'. 1tIl 1 % TaJa—jtztaii,
provided the home country were to reveal the true value ofa.
Incentives for truthful revelation would depend on how the tariff
revenues were to be distributed. For example, suppose that the homecountry8.
were to collect all of the tariff revenue.Then foreigners are paid their
marginal cost so that x(a) =vt(z*(a))z*(ct).In this case utility at home
would be
U(cz'/cz)= U(z*(a'))—v'(z*(ct'))z*(u') —(_a)r(z*(a')). (9)
Differentiating (9) with respect to the announcementa'andevaluating it at
a'= a weobtain
Ui(a/a)= -V"ZZ' 0, (10)
using(7).Thus the home countrywouldhavean incentive to announce a lower
valueofathan actually occurred, oritwould overstatethe pressure for
protection.
Alternatively,suppose that the foreign country wereto collect all the
tariff revenues, as would occur under "voluntary" exportrestraints.
Foreigners would receive the full domestic pricesof imports so x(a) =
u1(z*(a))Z*(a),and
U(a'/a)= u(z*(a'))—u1(z*(c1))Z*(a) — (_ct)r(z*(ct$)). (11)
Differentiating(11) with respect to the announcement a',andevaluating at
a'= a, yields
U1(ala) = — z*S[uu1Z*(a)+ (—a)r'J. (12)
Thisexpression is of ambiguous sign, so there maybe an incentive to
understateor overstate the value of a. Thisis because all consumers would
experience a decline in utility due tothe higher import price, but the factor9.
income for the median voter would alsorise, and the relative magnitude of
these effects is ambiguous.9
To conclude this section we characterizethe set of trade policies which
are incentive compatible. Assuming that z(ct)and x(a) are differentiable, a
local characterization of (IC)requires that
=0 for all a.
(13a)
0 for all a.
(13b)




Differentiating (13a) totally with respect toa implies U11 + U12 =0or
U120 by (13b). Hence
U12 =r'(z(c))z'(a) > 0
(15)
implying that z'(a) ) 0 since r'(z(a)) > 0.It turns out that given our
assumptions, the local (IC) conditions are sufficient toinsure (IC) holds
globally as well. These results are formally summarizedin:
Proposition 2 Necessary and sufficient conditions for(IC) are:
(a) U'(a) =r(z(a)),
(b) Z(a)isnondecreasing.
In what follows, the more technicalproofs of our results appear in the
appendix. Condition (a) of Proposition 2 has a naturalinterpretation. As a
increasesso that the political costs of importing decline, thereare two10.
sources of welfare improvements.There is a direct improvement which accrues
at the rate r(z). This measurethe decrease in political costs holdingthe
current level of imports constant.This gain accrues entirely to thedomestic
country. The other welfare gainoccurs as the level of importsis adjusted to
coincide with the lower political costs.
(13a) implies that this gain in
total welfare accrues to the foreign country,since tJ'(a) =r(z).The
domestic country captures only the
direct gain, hence there is noincentive
for it to misrepresent its political
costs, since it can not gain byaffecting
changes in either the levelof trade or the terms of trade.
4.Determination of Trade Restrictiqfl
One requirement for z(a), x(cz) tobe feasible is that it satisfy (IC).
Another requirement is that z(a), x(a),be individually rational (IR), meaning
that both countries must weakly preferthe trade vector <z(cz), x(a)> tothe
status quo vector <z0, x0>. This guaranteesthe voluntary participation of
each country in the negotiated agreement.(IR) is formally characterized by
two conditions:10
U(z(a),x(a),a)





Notice that since the home country canobserve a,werequire that it prefer
z(a), x(a)> to <Z0, xO> for all realizationsof a. The foreign country
cannot observe a so that we onlyrequire that it prefer <z(cz),x(a)> to <z°,
x0> in an expected value sense.11.
The determination of <z(a), x(a)> wouldpresumably involve bilateral
negotiations between the home and foreigncountry. One can imagine a myriad
of different processes andarrangements by which such trade agreements would
be Constituted. For ourpurposes it is convenient to assume that negotiations
are handled by a third party (perhaps by an institutionlike GATT) who
evaluates the claims of the home andforeign country in constructing a trade
agreement. In particular we imagine that theagreement <z(a), x(Q)> is
determined by maximizing the weightedsum of expected home country and foreign
country welfare subject to (IC) and (IR) constraints.Formally <z(a), x(a)>
is the solution to the following tradeproblem (TP):
Maximize ; [AU(z(a),x(),a) +V(z(a),x())]f(a)da (TP) x(a),z(a) a
subjectto (IC), (IR).In (TP) the weightmight be though of as reflecting
the relative bargaining power of the two countries.By varying x we may
examine how optimal trade policy responds to differentbargaining situations.
4.1 Solution for x 1
An interesting special case occurs whenx =1,for then the integrand in
(IF') simply becomes W(z,). The solution to (IF') for thecase where x >1is
recorded in:12.
Proposition 3 Suppose x1. Then <z(a), X(u)> satisfy:
(a) z(a) =Z*(a)for all




=1,then the Integrand in (TP) becomesW(z,a) and the
pointwise maximization of W(z,a)requires that Z(u)Z*(a) by (7). It's
clear from (b) and (c) that (IR)is satisfied. The proof is completed by
demonstrating that (IC) is alsosatisfied by PropositiOn 2. According to (c),
x(a),ci) =.—W(z,a) =r(z(a)).
Also z'(a) =Z*(a)) 0, thus completingthe proof for x =1.When x > 1,
more weight is placed on thewelfare of the domestic country, butits welfare
it already maximized for the caseof x =1,as indicated by (b) and (c).
Hence the solutions to (TP) for x> 1 and x =1coincide.
Proposition 3 is illustrated in Figure1. Suppose the initial situation
is that of free trade, z0 =z*(;).If the home country experience political
pressure of a < a, the politicallyoptimal position would beZ*(a). This
could be achieved with the tariff,(a) in (8), and satisfies (IC)If the
foreign country's welfare isheld constant. In Figure 1 this meansthat the
area BCEF is collected astariff revenue, while ABCD istransferred back to
foreigners. If ABCD < BCEF, then
this Income transfer could occur by applying
the tariffonly to Imports exceeding the quotalimit zZ*ABCD/BCEF. This13.
tariff—quota policy would achieve the political optimum and also be incentive
compatible. Note that by construction the median voter at home gains from
this trade restriction. The magnitude of gain is measured as area ABG in
Figure 1, which is the difference between marginal utility and marginal cost
of imports, integrated over the reduction in z.
Proposition 3 demonstrates the existence of incentive compatible
agreements that provide for politically optimal trade. While such agreements
are feasible (they satisfy IR and IC) they require that all of the extra rents
generated by the agreement are captured by the home country, as indicated by
parts (b) and (c) of Proposition 3•11 Such an uneven distribution of rents is
unlikely to result from a bargaining process. Thus while the case x 1
serves as a useful benchmark for our analysis, the more likely scenario is
that x<1. This allows for some of the differential rents generated by the
negotiated agreement to accrue to the foreign country.
4.2 Solution for x<1
To solve (TP) for the case where< 1, it turns out to be convenient to
rewrite the problem taking explicit account of the constraints. (IR) requires
that U(z(a), x(a),cz)U(z°,x°,cz) for all realizations of a. The graph of
U(x0,z0,cx) appears in Figure 2. The slope of U(x°,z°,a) with respect to a is
r(z°). Recall that (IC) requires that —U(z(a),x(a)a)=r(z(a))and that
z(a) be nondecreasing. Since r'(z) > 0, this means that the slope of
U(z(ct),x(ct),a) is nondecreasing as well. Cases where U(z(u),x(a),a) =
U(z°,x°,a)over two distinct intervals are not possible, since then
—.U(z(cz),x(a)a)is not increasing everywhere.12 Hence U(Z(cz),x(ct),a) and14.
U(z0,x0,cz) can only coincide over a singleinterval as depicted in Figure 2.
Further since x< 1,(IR) for the home country will always bind over some
interval.
Let us denote the interval over which (IR)binds as [czl,a2], where aal
(aa. Then (IC) implies:
U(z°,x°,cxi) —fr(z(a))da aEtcz,ai]
a
U(a) = U(a)=U(z°,x°,a) ac[al,cz2] (16)
a -
U(z0,xO,cz2)+f r(z(a))da aE[ct2,a].










Substituting the expression in (17) for x(a)in the statement of (TP), we
have after some simplification,15.
maximize ?1 W(z,a) —(1_A)[U(ZO,xO,ai)—falr(z(a))daj)f(a)da
z(a),al,c12a a
+ .rU2{W(z0,a)-(1-x)U(Z°,x°,a)}f(a)dcx
+ 1a (z,a) -(1_x)[U(zO,x0,a2)+ far(z(a))da])f(a)da
subject to (IC), (IR). Finally, integrating by parts allowsus to express the
trade problem as,
maximize f {W(z,a) —(lX)[U(z°,x°,cz)—________
z(a),al,cz2U




subject to (IR) and (IC), where F(.a) is the cumulative density for.
Tosolve (TP') we require that the following regularity condition (RC)
on the density f(a) be satisfied:
.—.
>0 for all a,— 0 for all a. (RC)
(RC) is satisfied by a wide class of densities including the uniform and
normal densities. With (RC) we are guaranteed that Z(a) isnondecreasing in
the solution to (TP'), as required by (IC).13
A characterization of the trade policy which solves (TP') isgiven by:16.
Proposition 4 Suppose x < 1, and (RC)holds. Then the solution to (TP') for
zOc(z*(a), z*(;)) satisfies:
(a) 2 < al < < a < '
(b)z*(a) < z(a) < z°, for
z(cz) =z° ,for
z0 < z(cz) < z*(a), for
(e) z(cz) is nondecreasing.
where cz* is defined by z*(a*) =z°;





























Results for the corner case where z0 =z*(a)or z0 =Z*(;)will be seen
to be limiting cases of Proposition 4.
4.3 Interpretation of Negotiated Trade Policy
Parts (a) —(c) of Proposition 4 are illustrated in Figures 2 and 3.
Figure 2 illustrates that (IR) binds along an interior interval of the support
for a. Figure 3 shows the relationship between the negotiated import level
z(a), the status quo level z0, and the politically optimal level of imports
Recall that when x 1,negotiatedtrade is politically optimal with
z(a) =z*(a)for all .Theproblem with this is that the home country earns
all of the rents from the negotiation. By allowing x<1 we distribute some
of the rents from negotiation to the foreign country as indicated by part c of
Proposition 4. However, when x<1, the negotiated trade vector is no longer
politically optimal. According to Proposition 4 and Figure 3, the level of
imports is too large for small realization of a and it is too small for large
realizations of a. This deviation from politically optimal trade is explained
as follows.
Let's suppose for the sake of illustration that one attempts to implement
a policy with z(a) =z*(a)for all a, and that all of the gains accrue to the
foreign country subject to satisfying (IR) at home.15 In this case
x(a) =W(z*(a),a))—LJ(z0,x0,cz)+ v(z*(a)). Does this policy satisfy (IC)?
Given the trade vector <z*(a), x(a)> we have,
U(a'/a) =u(z*(aI))—(_a)r(z*(ao))—v(z*(cz'))—W(Z*(cz'),a)+ U(z°,x°,a').18.
Differentiating U(a'/a) with respect to a' and evaluatingthe expression at
a' =ayields,
Ui(cz/a)= r(z°)-r(z*(a)) 0 for a a*, (18)
where a* satisfies z0 =z*(cx*). Accordingto (18) there is an incentive to
overstate the political costs of importing for a > a*,and there is an
incentive to understate these costs when a < cL*.
When a < a* the way to prevent the home country from claimingthat it's
political costs are low when they are really high(i.e., when a is small) is
to force the country to import more when itdeclares that its costs are low.
This discourages a high cost country from behavinglike a low cost importer.
Similarly, when a > a*, the way to prevent thehome country from claiming
large political costs when its costs are reallylow, is to restrict the level
of imports when the country claims high politicalcosts. This makes it less
attractive for a low cost country to claim that it is a highcost importer.
The necessity to eliminate incentives for misrepresentation bythe home
country explains the distortions of the importlevel z(cz) from the politically
optimal level. Note that at the end points aand ;, it is not necessary to
distort import levels and z(cz) =z*(a).This is because there are no lower a
types who would try to claim that they are an atype, and there are no higher
a types who would try to claim they areantype.
An alternative way to characterize the negotiatedtrade policy is to
examine the tariff, T =u'-v',which is the difference between the domestic
and foreign price of the import, and the marginal politicalcost of importing






by part e of Proposition 4•16 Generally, however, the tariff will not equal
the marginal political cost of importing as would be required if the level of
imports were politically optimal. Part b of Proposition 4 implies that
W {} 0 as a } a*.
Hence when a < u so that political costs are high, W < 0 implies that
T <(a—a)r'(z)=
MCor that the tariff is less than the marginal political
costs of importing. The tariff exceeds the marginal political cost of
importing when political costs are relatively low, such that a >ci*.
An interesting feature of the negotiated trade agreement <z(a), x(a)> is
the extent to which it coincides with the status quo agreement <z°, x0>. One
way to implement negotiated trade is to allow the home country to select an
import—export combination from the specified trade schedule <z(a), x(a)>. The
amount of autonomy afforded the home country is reflected in the degree to
which <z(cz), x(a)> differs from <zO, x0>. Note that the choice of zO is
politically optimal for some level of costs, a*. Figure 3 shows that for
values of a sufficiently close to cx*, negotiated trade simply calls for
implementing <zO, xO> since z0 is close to being politically optimal.
However, as indicated in Figure 3, greater decision making authority is
afforded the home country when realized political costs differ significantly
from a*. The home country is allowed to use its knowledge of political costs
to pick an import level which is more efficient than the status quo level z0.20.
Part d of Proposition 4 indicates that the coincidencebetween
<z(a), x(ct)> and <TO, x0> diminishes as x increases.When more weight is
placed on the welfare of the home country, Itis afforded more decision making
authority. In Figure 3, higher x means that theinterval (cq,cx2) shrinks, and
2(a) moves closers to z*(a). In the limit when x =1,the bornecountryis
delegated complete authority to choose imports, andz(a) =z*(ct).However this
is done at the expense of the foreign country. Hencethe autonomy of the home
country must be restricted if the foreign countryis to obtain any gain from
the negotiated agreement.
To conclude this section we note that the preceedingdiscussion has
assumed that z*(cz) < z0 < z*(;). The negotiated trade policydoes not change
significantly in the corner cases where either (I)z0z*(a) or (ii) z0
*().Incase (i) one can show <2(a), x(a)> coincideswith <z0, x0> over
some interval [al,c*2] where a =a< < :.Forctc(a2,:), 2(a) < z*(cz) and
2(u) =Z*(;).In case (ii) one can show that <2(a), x(cz)> coincides with
<z°, x0> over [a],a2] where a < a 2 =a.For ac(a,ai), z(a) > z*(a) and
z(a) =z*(cz).It can be seen that these corner cases are just limiting cases
of the policy described in Proposition 4.
5. Political Pressure in Both Countries
Suppose that the foreign government alsohas pressure to raise the income
of its median voter. With the labor-intensive good exportedabroad, the
optimal foreign trade policy would involve expanding exports.We shall
incorporate the foreign political pressureinto our statement of (TP), and
investigate whether a negotiated trade restriction cansatisfy (IC) for both
countries.21.
Analogous to U(z,x,a) in Proposition 1, utility of the median voter
abroad can be stated as
V(z,x,8) =x—v(z)—(B—8)s(z), (19)
where [8,8] is the median capital/labor endowment abroad, and s(z) is the
foreign rental on capital depending on exports. An Increase in exports would
reduce the amount of the labor-intensive good available abroad, thereby
raising its price and lowering the rental, so s' <0.The countries will now
negotiate a schedule of trades <z(a,B), x(a,8)> contingent on a and B
announced by each of them. We shall consider a dominant strategy where, for
any value of B, the home government has an incentive to truthfully announce a,
and similarly for the foreign country. Let U(a,B) and V(a,B) denote welfares
with the announced and true values of (,B). Then analogous to Proposition 2,
(IC) at home requires:'7
LJa= [u'-(a-a)r']za —xa+r(z)=r(z), (20a)
za(a,8) 0. (20b)
Similarly, (IC) abroad requires:
=—[v'+(B—B)s']zB +xB+s(z)=s(z), (21a)
ZB(cx,B) 0. (21b)
Consider maximizing the integral of world welfare W(z,a,B), defined as
the sum of (4) and (19), subject to (IC) and a statement of (IR) for both
countries. We are interested in the set of trade schedules z(a,B) which can
satisfy the (IC) constraints. Differentiating (20a) with respect to B we22.
obtain an expression for while differentiating (21a) with respect to
yields xa. Setting these equal and simplifying, we obtain the following
partialdifferential equation for z(a,8):
WzzZZ8 + WzZ = 0. (22)
Theclass of solutions to (22), where statements of (.IR) can be used to
provide boundary conditions, defines the set of trade schedules over which
world welfare can be maximized. We have not been able to obtain any
non—trivial solutions to (22).18 However, It is significant that we rule out
the politically optimal level of trade z*(,e), at which Wz(Z*,cz,) =0and
world welfare is maximized without the (IC) constraints.'9 To see this,
differentiate the latter condition to obtainz* =r'/Wzz>0and
=s'/W<0,where Wzz <0is assumed.2° Thus, with politically optimal
trade (22) reduces to r's'/Wzz =0,which can never hold. We have therefore
established:
Proposition 5 Politically optimal trade z*(,) cannot satisfy (IC) for both
countries.
Proposition 5 can be understood as follows. With political pressure only
at home, the optimum Z*(a) was incentive compatible when the home country
received all the gains from restricting trade (Proposition 3). Foreign
welfare was constant at its status quo level. However, in the discussion
around (18) we argued that a constant level of welfare could not be incentive
compatible for that country. Thus, with political pressure In both countries,
(IC) requires some sharing of the gains from negotiated trade. Analogous to
Proposition 4, this implies a trade schedule which Is not at the first best
optimum.23.
6.ConclusIons
The approach we have utilized to explain trade negotiationcontrasts with
the repeated game view of such negotiations (e.g.,McMillan, 1986). Here one
envisions that two or more countries who trade with each otherrepeatedly
reach an agreement, which is enforced by the threat of reversionto
protectionist policies should one of the countries violate theagreement.
Violations are only profitable for a country if It can "cheat"on the
agreement for some minimal period of time until its trading partner discovers
the violation. With this view, one interprets changes from thestatus quo
agreement as evidence of retaliation against countries who have been caught
violating the agreement. While such behavior is possible we think it is
unlikely that countries would believe that trade violations they would
contemplate would go unnoticed for very long. This is because trade policy is
a matter of public record, and is subject to scrutiny and review by various
special interest groups that have a stake in the outcome of the trading
process. In contrast to this, the model we have adopted assumes that
unilateral deviations by a country from the status quo agreement can be
observed, but that incentives for one country to deviate from the agreement
can't be verified or observed by its trading partners. Thismeans that the
countries must bargain In an Incomplete Information environment.
Our results can be given two Interpretations. First, as a positive
theory, they suggest a reason for the use of "voluntary" trade restraints
rather than tariffs. A VER is generally requested by the Importingcountry,
but the quota rents are earned by the exporter. One reason for the transfer
of rents is that the exporter Is compensated for the trade restriction (as
discussed byDeardorff,1986), and so retaliation is not expected. However,
our analysis suggests another reason: the transfer of rents means that the24.
trade restriction is incentive compatible, I.e., if the importingcountry did
not actually face strong political pressure, it would notfind it beneficial
to have the restriction. Thus, the transfer of rentsbecomes a policing
device to ensure that political pressure is truthfullyrevealed.
However, it should be noted that an incentive compatible policywill not
generally involve a full transfer of the quota rents, asoccurs under the VER.
For example, in Proposition 3 the transfer is justsufficient to return the
foreign country to its status quo utility. Wecharacterized this policy as a
"tariff-quota," in which the tariff is applied only to importsexceeding some
limit. In Proposition 4 the foreign country obtains higherwelfare, but the
transfer would equal the full revenue/rents only by coincidence.The
interpretation of our model as an explanation forVER's is therefore limited.
Another interpretation of our results is as a normative theory,
suggesting a policy which could be applied toactual trade restrictions. The
simple results (Proposition 3) state that the foreigncountry should be
exactly compensated for any trade restriction, keepingits utility unchanged.
The amount of compensation required is easilycalculated from the foreign
supply curve, as illustrated in Figure 1, andcould be implemented with an
appropriate tariff-quota. To raise foreignwelfare beyond its status quo
level requires a more complicated policy (Proposition4). In this case the
initiallevel of trade is preserved over a discrete interval of a(see Figure
3). For levels of political pressure outsidethis interval, trade is
restricted or increased,butdoes not coincide with the political optimum.
Theprivate nature of political pressure athome is In this case imposing a
cost which lowers world welfare. This resultalso occurs with private
political pressure in both countries (Proposition5), even if the countries
have equal weight in world welfare.25.
Footnotes
1. SeeBrockand Magee (1978), Cassing and Hiliman (1985), Findlay and
Wellisz (1982), Feenstra and Bahgwati (1982), Hiliman (1982), Young and
Magee (1986) and Wilson and Wellisz (1986).
2. The idea of incentive compatible trade policies was introduced in Feenstra
(1987), who considered production uncertainty with two possible states.
The present paper is also related to Jensen and Thursby (1986), who
suppose that the foreign country does not know the home objective function
with certainty. They examine Nash equilibrium tariffs of Bayesiangames.
Prusa (1987) examines an incentive compatibility approach to the transfer
pricing problem.
3. See The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 6, 1987, p. 40, and Hufbauer and Rosen
(1986).
4. The distribution of capital ownership is skewed to the right for most
developed countries.
5. To show that u' =p,use (1) and (3) to derive u' =4(y1TT'+l)+Y2'=
p+i'(PYj+Y)
=psince PY1 +y
=0when the competitive economy
maximizes GNP.
6. We restrict our attention to trade policies (choice of z and x), used to
raise income of the median voter. These should be considered as
second-best since, as shown by Mayer and Riezman (1987), they can be
dominated by a production subsidy and consumption tax with the tariff used
only to influence the terms of trade. Before examining domestic
instruments in this model, however, it is necessary to consider the
information structure. For example, production subsidies could
realistically be considered as private information to each country.26.
Dislocation costs would be private Information to workers, which affects
the feasibility of factor market interventions. We feel that a ranking of
trade and domestic instruments should only be made with Information
asymetries of this type Incorporated.
7. We assume thatis not so low that the home government would want to
reverse the pattern of trade. This is ensured if a equals the capital
labor ratio which, if used in production, would yield autarky. Then the
optimal trade policy for the median voter will not restricttrade that
far.
8. The Relevation Principle assures us that there is no loss in generality
from considering incentive compatible policies (see Myerson, 1979).
9.A presumption that (12) is negative, leading to an overstatement of
political pressure, is obtained by requiring that home welfareunder the
VER is greater than with free trade. Free trade occurs when =
yieldingutility U(cxIcL). Then U(czlci) U(:/c) implies that U1(a/a)0
for some aEa,;], and if this condition holds for a =then (12) is
negative. For the quadratic case mentioned after Proposition 1, we can
show that U1(a/) is minimized at a =, andso we must have Ui(/a)0
leading to an overstatement of political pressure.
10. With minimal loss of generality, we assume that z*(a)Z° Z*(cd.
Other cases are dealt with at the end of section 4.3.
11. This must be the allocation of rents given the restriction thatz0
[Z*(a), Z*(ct)]. In that case (IR) requires that U(z*(a*),x*(u*),cz*)
=U(zO,xO,cz*)where e [a,;] is defined by zO(;*) =z*(ct*).Further,
(IC) implies that U'(;) =r(z*(;)),while dW(z*(;),a)/dcz =r(z*(;))by
the envelope theorem. Condition (c) follows from the fact that27.
=W(Z*(a*),a*)—V(z0,x0)and U'(cx) =dW(Z*(cz),cz)/da.
12. This is readily seen by redrawing Figure 2, with U(z(a),x(a),a)
coinciding with lJ(z0,x0,) on two seperate intervals.
13. If Z(a) Is decreasing in the solution to (TP') then the solution must be
modified to satisfy the constraint that z(a) be everywhere
nonedecreasing. Typically this means that there will be Intervals over
which z(a) is constant.
14. Note that Z(a) takes a discontinuous upward jump at asdepicted in
Figure 3. See the proof of Proposition 3 for details.
15. Ignoring the (IC) constraint, this policy would maximize (TP) whenx <1.
16. To sign the change in MC we also require r"0. This would be
satisfied In the quadratic case mentioned after Proposition 1, for which
r"=O.
17. For concreteness, we shall assume that z and x are twice continuously
differentiable functions of (a,8).
18. It is not difficult to construct solutions for which2aorzA are
identically zero, while also satisfying (IR) for both countries.
19. This result is not surprising. It is well known that dominant strategy
pareto efficient mechanisms typically don't exist in general economic
environments (e.g., Groves and Ledyard, 1985).
20. This concavity condition is guaranteed if the quadratic case discussed
after Proposition 1 is applied to both countries.28.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 2
Necessity. Follows from arguments presented in thetext.






= '(a) + ;r(z(a))da (A2.1)
a
where'Y(a)isan arbitrary constant. Using (A2.1) we have (assuminga2< a1)
U(a1/a')— U(a2/a1)








where the second equality follows by using (A2.1). Thefinal line of (A2.2)
follows from al >aand z(a) nondecreasiflg. A similar proof applies when al
< a2.A. 2
Proof of Proposition 4
Pointwise maximization of (TP') yields the following conditions
Wz(Z,ci) + (1—k)r'F(a)0 (=ifz(a) < z°) ac[a,al] (A4.1) f (a)
Wz(Z,cz) —(1—x)r[1—F(u)]< 0 (=ifz(a) > z°) acCa2,iJ (A4.2) f(a)
where (IC) implies z(a) z0 for ac[cx,cc]] and Z(a)z0 for ara2,;]. Let
H(al,a2) be the integral over 1,;]ofthe total weighted surplus for (TP').





(1—X)r(z(a2) )[1—F(a2)J =- (W(z(a2),a2)+ W(z°,a2) + _________________ (A4.4) f(a2)
Note (IC) implies that z(a)z(al) z0 for all aal. According to (A4.l)
Wz(Z,a) < 0 for aal. This together with the fact that W is concave and
z(a) z0 implies _!i._>o.Hence,cq is determined as inf(alz(a) =z°) aal
provided aia. Otherwise al =a,which occurs when z0 =z*(cx).
To determine a2 we note that when z(a2) =z0 > 0. Since Wz(z,cz) > 0
for a a, and W is concave we must have z(a2) > z0 atU2inorder for
a
provideda2 < .Ifz0 =z*(),then a =A.3
Suppose z0 =z*()for Then since al =lnf(aIZ(a)
=z°)and
< 0 we have a < .Italso follows that a >since > 0.
This proves part (a) of Proposition 4.
According to (A4.1) and (A4.2)
Wz(z,cx) =0for a =a,a, (A4.5)
thus implying z(a) =z*(a)for a =a,a. Recall that W is concavein Z. This
together with (A4.1) and (A4.2) imply
z(cz) > z*(a) ,ac(a,al)
(A4.6)
z(cz) < z*(cl) , ac(a2,cz).
Finally z(a) =z°for acEal,a2] by construction. This completesthe proof for
part b.









where the second line of (A4.8) follows from rewriting the expression
U(z°,x0,al) and the third line follows from z(a) < z0 for a < cx'. A similar
argument can also be used to show that U(z(a),x(a),a) > U(z°,x°,c) for
ac(a2,a].
For cxc [a,a) we have
V(z(a),x(a)) =W(z(a),a)—U(z(a),x(a),a)








where the second line of (A4.9) follows from rewriting W(z(a),a) and
U(Z(a),x(a),cx) and the third line follows from the fact that W < 0 for
ac[a,a). An argument similar to (A4.9) serves to establish V(z(cx),x(a)) >
V(z°,x°) for ac(cx2,cz]. This completes our proof of part (c).
To establish the comparative static effects of a change in A, one totally
differentiates (A4.l) and (A4.2) with respect to x to obtain









where the denominators in (A4.1.O) are both negative, providedthe second order
conditions for pointwise maximization of (TP') aresatisfied.
To establish the comparative statics results for a changein x on al,
recall that al is determined by the condition z(u) =z0,where z() satisfies
(A4.1). Differentiating (A4.1) totally with respect to xreveals that
dz(a)/dA <0,implying that dcq/dX >0.For a recall that a is determined
by dH/da2 =0.Differentiating this expression totally with respect to Aand
recognizing that z(c12) >zyields <0,thus completing the proof of part d.
To complete the proof of the Proposition we must showthat z(a) is
nondecreasing. Totally differentiating (A4.1) and (A4.2)with respect toand
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